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ARTICLES
COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET:
FROM OWNER RIGHTS AND USER
DUTIES TO USER RIGHTS AND
OWNER DUTIES?
David Vavert
INTRODUCTION
This article looks both backwards and forwards (although not
simultaneously). First, the claimed assumptions of the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Internet treaties will be
re-examined,1 particularly the notion of copyright as a balance
between owners and users. We may find that the treaties, like wines
that were coarse when vinified, have not improved with age. Second,
the paper examines some problems involved in implementing the
treaties. The focus is mainly on the U.K. and Europe, with the
occasional sideways glance elsewhere. Lastly, the paper concludes by
suggesting that the metaphor of copyright balance be taken more
seriously, and by revisiting the neglected field of user rights and
owner duties in copyright law and policy.
t MA (Oxon.), B.A., LL.B. (Auckland), J.D. (Chicago); Emeritus Professor of
Intellectual Property & Information Technology Law, University of Oxford; former Director,
Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre; Emeritus Fellow, St Peter's College, Oxford.
Professor Vaver is, from July 2009, Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Toronto.
I For a survey of the WIPO treaties closer to the time of their conclusion, see D. VAVER,
INTERNATIONALIZING COPYRIGHT LAW: IMPLEMENTING THE WIPO TREATIES (Nov. 16, 1999),
www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/FJWP0199.pdf.
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THE WIPO INTERNET TREATIES: GREAT ASSUMPTIONS,
SMALL TRUTH
Since the late 19th century, multilateral copyright treaties have,
with a few hiccoughs, had a habit of being renewed or revised every
generation or so. The first Berne Convention in 1886 included a
provision requiring periodic revision but said nothing about
frequency. The cycle of renewal every twenty years or so may have
several explanations. Perhaps it takes a new generation to shed old
thought habits and invent and promote new technologies that elude
existing laws which now must be "dealt with" to accommodate their
novelty. Perhaps each new generation that succeeds to the executive
boardrooms of right holders wants some easy new way to prolong
revenue streams: simply getting the rules of the game changed in its
favour is a good low-cost option. Perhaps one set of treaty negotiators
simply can't bear re-facing the same problems until they have been
replaced by a fresh generation of negotiators with no memory of how
gruesome the last occasion was. Perhaps now that so much IP is being
renegotiated internationally--often bilaterally or regionally in free
trade agreements-each IP right must wait its turn on the schedule for
individual attention. Technologies may change annually or faster, but
international legal responses may take time: years, even decades.2
These elements were all more or less present when the WIPO
treaties came to be negotiated in the mid-1990s. The last revision of
the Berne Convention in Stockholm in 1967, which concluded with
the Paris Act of 1971, had been a fractious affair with developing
nations demanding some crumbs from the copyright pie that had till
then been the sole preserve of the developed world's industries. The
developing dissidents got a few worthless scraps but their power play
highlighted WIPO's vulnerability. No longer did WIPO look quite the
safe haven for copyright rules minted by and for the usual industry
players.
The rest of the story is familiar. After the U.S. became a convert to
the book of Berne in 1988, it moved to reshape world IP rules in its
image through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") and World Trade Organization ("WTO"). WIIPO found
itself an impotent bystander as the U.S., Europe and Japan used the
Uruguay round of the GATT talks to impose new WIPO-plus IP rules
on those nations with a serious interest in international trade-i.e.,
pretty well everyone. It was a desire to regain its status and rebrand
2 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System:
New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 205 (2006).
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itself as world IP kingpin that caused WIPO to pursue a diplomatic
conference to update copyright rules to the new Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")
standards and to further the copyright agenda by including new rules
for the Internet and the digital environment. To make its point, WIPO
did not name the treaties for Geneva, their place of conclusion. Unlike
the great conventions of Paris, Berne, and Rome, the new treaties
were entitled simply the WIPO Treaty on Copyright ("WCT") and the
WIPO Treaty on Performances and Producers ("WPPT")-lest those
WTO upstarts forgot who really was international boss on copyright
and neighbouring rights reform.
The simultaneous push at Geneva to conclude a treaty creating
European-style database rights fizzled-wisely, perhaps, in light of
the later angst that came to surround that right in Europe. Database
rights, introduced in Europe also in 1996, certainly proved a boon for
IP and media lawyers, who benefited mightily from having to advise
on and litigate cases arising under the new legislation. Few others
benefited. The claim that a database right would stimulate the
production of more and better databases in Europe proved illusory, as
its critics had predicted. All the scheme did and continues to do is to
create additional costs, obstacles and uncertainties for users and
alleged beneficiaries alike.3
The WCT and the WPPT were signed in 1996 and took effect in
2002, having received the necessary 30 ratifications. Since then,
ratifications have almost doubled but the number of complying states
is much greater. Still formally off the list, for example, are individual
European Union ("EU") member states, even those who initially
signed the treaties. They have been put off signing by the EU itself,
which also signed the treaties on its own behalf and proposes to ratify
them once all members are in compliance. At future revision rounds,
the EU will then be able to exercise its members' votes en bloc.
Meanwhile, the slightly odd situation prevails that Poland has ratified
the treaties (having done so before it became an EU member) while
states such as the U.K., Germany and France have not, even though
their national laws have implemented them.
Pressure is also being put on other states to comply. Thus, any
bilateral Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") to which the U.S. is a party
invariably contains, at U.S. insistence, a clause requiring the parties to
ratify and implement the WIPO treaties. The obligation is of course
one-way since the U.S. has already ratified and implemented them.
3 I agree with Mark Davison on this; see generally Mark Davison, Database Protection:
Lessons from Europe, Congress, and WIPO, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 829 (2007).
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This insistence produces a snowball effect: states that come under this
obligation to their U.S. partner will seek likewise to impose this
obligation when negotiating their own bilateral FTA deals with other
states. So what the U.S. did to Singapore and Australia in its FTAs
with them, Singapore and Australia did to each other in the
Singapore-Australia FTA.4
The date of signing of the WCT and WPPT-December 20th,
1996-was appropriate. Copyright holders got their Christmas
present for 1996 and decades to come: international legal control over
digital and online distribution of current and future inventory. But
they gave nothing in return: copyright holders' view of exchange is
"you give, we take." All these modem day Scrooges were happy to
give in exchange for their new rights of control was the certainty of
higher prices for the products they control and less freedom to the
public to do what it wished with copyright material. With this came
what holders have always been liberal in providing, this time through
their proxies in the contracting governments: plenty of humbug. Take
the WCT's preambles. 5 The first testifies to the parties' desire to
develop and protect the rights of "authors" as effectively and
uniformly as possible. This parrots the convenient fiction that
copyright law drafters deliberately created from at least the first
Berne Convention onwards.6 In fact, copyright is geared less to
protect the rights of authors than those of copyright "owners." The
fiction finds its familiar, if grotesque, root in the U.S. "work for hire"
doctrine: an employee author is no author at all, his employer is; and
the actual writer, artist or composer is a useful extra who makes a
quick entrance and is then noiselessly dispatched stage left. Other
countries reach similar results, although not quite as crudely: the
employee may maintain his status as author (and so sometimes retain
his moral rights) but the employer is made either the initial title owner
or the automatic successor to the author's initial title.
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAIFTA") and
TRIPS try to keep the story of Little Red Riding Author straight, but
4 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.1(4) (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assetsfrrade-Agreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFrA/FinalText/assetuploa
d_file148_5168.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Austl. FTA] ("Each Party shall ratify or accede to the
WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (1996) by
the date of entry into force of this Agreement, subject to the fulfilment of their necessary
internal requirements"); Free Trade Agreement, Sing.-Austl., ch. 13, arts. 2(2-3), July 28, 2003,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfatltreaties/2003/16.html [hereinafter
Sing.-Austl. FTA] (but providing a 4-year grace period).
5 Similar provisions appear in the WPPT.
6 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND § 7.23 (2d ed. 2006).
734 [Vol. 57:4
COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET
can't stop Big Bad Owner wolf from gobbling up grandma. Thus, in
one provision the treaties track Berne by referring to "authors and
their successors in title" (TRIPS) or "authors and successors in
interest" (NAFIA); in another, nations are told not to enact copyright
exceptions or limitations that unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests "of the right holder.",7 The reason for these equivocations is
no secret. When promoting the first copyright law of 1710, the
London stationers knew that laws that claim to protect authors attract
more attention and sympathy than laws that claim to protect
publishers. Today's media and entertainment executives and the
diplomats that draft treaties for them are no less savvy.
Consider too the WCT's third preamble. There the routine
boilerplate of copyright laws and treaties reappears: the parties claim
to "emphasiz[e] the outstanding significance of copyright protection
as an incentive for literary and artistic creation." Far from copyright
having "outstanding significance" to encourage literary and artistic
creativity, we know that much copyright-protected production is
routine stuff-including academic papers and law review articles-
that would occur without the lure of copyright, and certainly without
a lure that runs for a minimum 70 years, with a variable automatic
maximum of perhaps another 70 or more, depending on the youth of
the author at the time the work was produced and his eventual
longevity. It would be more honest to say that copyright has, as the
WPPT recognized for record producers, "outstanding significance" to
protect the distribution systems of copyright owners-but once again,
that would be to reveal too much to the ignorantes.
The final bad joke lies in the WCT's fifth and final preamble.
There the parties claim to "recogniz[e] the need to maintain a balance
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest,
particularly education, research and access to information, as
reflected in the Berne Convention."8
7 Compare North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1705(2), with
art. 1705(5), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 LL.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; compare General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round):
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, arts. 10 and 11 with art. 13, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
8 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty pmbl.,
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
wppt/trtdocs wo034.html#P109_12974 [hereinafter WPPT]. Although, the third preamble to the
WPPT downgrades the adjective: the development of technology has merely a "profound
impact" rather than an "outstanding significance" in the production of phonograms.
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Notice first the usual contrast: copyright owners ("authors") have
rights, while the public has none. It has a mere "interest" in education,
research and access to information.
Notice next how this "larger public interest" is actually recognised
in the operative provisions of the WCT: not by any affirmative
provision that says straightforwardly that states may enact user rights
to further that interest. Instead there is a crabbed provision that allows
states to enact "limitations of or exceptions to" the copyright holder's
rights if, but only if, the provision passes what has come to be dubbed
a "3-step test," but which more aptly should be called a "triple
gauntlet." This ordeal beats these "limitations or exceptions" down to
(1) only "certain special cases" that (2) do not "conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work," and that (3) do not "unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the right holder."9
If user rights were truly to be balanced against owner rights, one
would expect to find a provision that owner rights should be enacted
or enforced only in (1) certain special cases that (2) demonstrably
encourage the production of the work, and that (3) do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of users. That feature
of balance does not yet appear on any WIPO or TRIPS agenda. It
should.
Notice finally the more basic point of this fifth preamble: how it
reverses the importance of ends and means. It implies that copyrights
are ends in themselves and that the public interest is subordinate,
something to be balanced off against the self-evident truths of
copyright. Compare this with how copyright was first introduced in
early 18th century England. The Statute of Anne of 1710 had, in the
fashion of the day, a long title that stated both ends and means. It was
not called a Copyright Act, but instead an act "for the encouragement
of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or
purchasers of such copies."
Drafting convention today would shorten this mouthful simply to
"The Learning Encouragement Act." But the old long title got things
the right way round. The law's object was to further learning; its
means were to grant a copyright to the author and (obviously and
more honestly than the WIPO treaties admit) to those who bought the
author out. The clause on copyright in the U.S. Constitution
9 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/
trtdocswo033.html [hereinafter WCT] (applying the restriction to rights under the WCT in art.
10, § 1; applying it to applications of the Berne Convention art. 10, § 1). How far the fifth
preamble requires the triple gauntlet to be eased beyond the severe interpretations WTO panels
have placed on virtually identical language in art. 13 of TRIPS may be worth considering.
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consciously tracks the English pattern: it is expressly "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts" that Congress is empowered
to enact laws granting authors and inventors "the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."'10 Three centuries on, the
WIPO treaties turn this discourse on its head. The means-copyrights
-are treated as ends in themselves, not as measures that are
justifiable only if, and insofar as, they further education, research and
access to information. To subordinate these goals and treat them as
mere "interests" to be balanced against self-evidently justifiable
means, is a perversion of history, logic, and-if that matters-good
public policy.
In fact, the last thing the promoters of the WCT and WPPT wanted
was for copyrights to be traded off against other rights or even
interests. The first thing they did was to entrench in the treaties the
provisions in TRIPS that reined governments in from acting on their
view of the public interest in furthering education, research and
access to information: the triple gauntlet any user right had to run to
survive." Next the promoters compelled states to legitimize how
copyright owners were using technology: first, to track who was
accessing their products and what they were doing with it; and
second, to block copying of information except on the copyright
owner's terms. The means of compulsion was a requirement that
states enact measures to clamp down on devices that avoided
anti-copying and tracking technology. 12 The WCT promoters even
initially tried to restrict governments from acting in "the larger public
interest" to grant users access rights that were permitted under the
Berne Convention. In this attempt, however, they failed, at least
temporarily. The diplomatic conference finally adopted an agreed
statement allowing users to have access to digitized products within
the limits permitted by Berne. 13 But the access must still run the three
gauntlets-a restriction first introduced by TRIPS but not one
required across-the-board under Berne.
EU IMPLEMENTATION: HARMONIZATION AND OTHER BAD Music
The EU implemented the WCT and WPPT in a copyright directive
of 2001.14 Eurocrats promoted it as a directive to promote the
10 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8.
1 WCT, supra note 9, at art. 10; WPPT, supra note 8, at art. 16.
12 WCT, supra note 9, at arts. 11-12; WPPT, supra note 8, at arts.18-19.
13 WCT, supra note 9, at n.10 (agreed statement adopted by the Diplomatic Conference
concerning art. 10); WPPT, supra note 8, at n.15 (agreed statement adopted by the Diplomatic
Conference concerning art. 16).
14 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter Stranglehold
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so-called "information society"; but if its name is truly to reflect its
contents and intent, it should be dubbed a directive to promote and
secure the stranglehold of copyright owners over digital content, for
short the "Stranglehold Directive"-and so I shall refer to it here.
This measure was part of a wider drive the European Community
("EC") had undertaken since the 1980s to standardize national IP
laws with the aim of eliminating differences that impeded the smooth
working of the single European market, i.e., to create a level IP
playing field throughout Europe.
While good in theory, standardization-or the more attractively
sounding "harmonization"-has been a mixed boon in practice. The
EC adopted the dogma that the more IP there is, the better. In its own
bureaucratese: "Any harmonisation of copyright and related rights
must take as a basis a high15 level of protection, since such rights are
crucial to intellectual creation."' 16 So, unsurprisingly, the Stranglehold
Directive gives copyright holders more than the Internet treaties
required.
Perhaps more surprisingly, standardization has been only spottily
achieved. While some of the Stranglehold Directive's provisions are
mandatory, others are not; and even the mandatory ones are often
drafted so as to give member states a wide discretion on
implementation. Member states have acted accordingly. Anyone who
thinks that copyright rules for the digital environment produce a level
legal playing field throughout the EU for either right holders or users
will leave the pitch bloodied and bruised.
Anti-Circumvention Measures
The WIPO treaties bless the copyright industries' adoption of
technological means to fend off unauthorized copiers. "Adequate"
protection and "effective legal remedies" must be enacted against
"circumvention of effective technological measures" used "by
authors" in connection with the exercise of rights under the WCT,
WPPT or Berne. The provisions must be directed at restricting
infringing acts-i.e., those not "authorized by the authors concerned"
or "permitted by law."' 17 States thus have wide room on how to
implement this obligation: who should be liable for what, whether
civil or criminal law should apply, and what defences and remedies
Directive].
15 Not merely a "fair" level of protection.
16 Stranglehold Directive, supra note 14, at recital, 9.
H7 WCT, supra note 9, at art. 11, WPPT supra note 8, at art. 18.
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should be available. Implementation has varied depending on the
pressures national governments succumbed to and the precise
wording of the legislation involved.
The EU had already, in 1991, issued a directive on copyright for
computer programs. It included a short paragraph requiring action to
stop the circulation or commercial making, distribution or possession
of devices the sole intended purpose of which was to remove or
circumvent technical measures protecting computer programs against
copying. 18 The Stranglehold Directive left this earlier directive
standing.19 Since the WCT also covers computer programs,
presumably the 1991 directive was thought to comply fully with the
WCT. The U.K. had implemented it by imposing civil liability on
circumventers, makers, and distributors as if they were copyright
infringers. No criminal liability was attached. z
The Stranglehold Directive could have simply extended the
computer provision to all copyright matter. Instead the EU responded
to pressure to adopt a version of the U.S. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 by producing something as complex and
tortuous to read and understand as that Act, but with different
provisions.
First, the Stranglehold Directive imposes strict liability on
commercial makers, distributors, and providers of circumvention
devices and services, and those individuals who circumvent effective
technological measures with "knowledge or reasonable grounds to
know" they are doing so.
21
Second, an elaborate definition is provided of the technological
protection measures ("TPMs") that are covered and the practices that
are condemned. A key feature is that the TPM must be designed to
prevent or restrict acts that fall within the rights granted to copyright
owners. 22 Technology that restricts merely access to a product is not
included, since access as such is not a right granted to a copyright
holder. On the other hand, a digital product, to be viewed, usually
needs to be copied temporarily into a computer's RAM-the copying,
though ephemeral, is an act of reproduction and so within the
copyright owner's control. The WIPO treaties recognize this
phenomenon by extending the concept of reproduction only to digital
IS Council Directive 91/250/EEC, art. 7 § 1(c) 2001 O.J. (L 122) 42; see also Copyright,
Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296 (Eng.) (as amended in 2003) [hereinafter CDPA].
19 Stranglehold Directive, supra note 14, at art. 1(2)(a).
20 CDPA, supra note 18, at § 296 in its original form and as amended in 2003.
21 Stranglehold Directive, supra note 14, at arts. 6, §§ 1-2.
22 Id. at art. 6(3).
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"storage," not transient copying.13 The Stranglehold Directive
translates this view into a mandatory exemption for uses that are
lawful, "transient or incidental, [and] an integral and essential part of
a technological process ...which [has] no independent economic
significance. 24 Once upon a time, this activity was called "reading"
or "viewing."
A further difficulty should be noted. A law that treats
circumvention issues differently depending on whether the item
protected is a computer program or something else is technologically
moronic. If one plays a video game, computer programs and other
copyrighted matter (audiovisual, literary, musical and artistic)
interact. If, as is common, the maker of the player console and the
games played on it is the same, whether TPMs protect the program,
the games or their hybrid interaction is factually an issue of
engineering and legally a matter of chance. To treat
anti-circumvention measures for programs less favourably than those
for other material suggests that programs are getting less than
"adequate" protection under the WCT. Adequacy is not an absolute
quantity: it invites comparison ("adequate" in relation to what?). Not
only may the laws of other states be taken as comparators, but also so
may the state's own laws on analogous subject-matter.
Third, the Stranglehold Directive wants right holders to let lawful
users benefit from most national exemptions. Unfortunately, this
indulgence applies only if no "voluntary measures taken by
rightholders, including agreements between rightholders and other
parties concerned" exist. Moreover, where members of the public can
access material on "agreed contractual terms ... from a place and at a
time individually chosen by them," the rightholder is totally relieved
of the exemption-for-all provision. 5 Exactly what services, other than
video on-demand, are covered by the latter language is far from clear.
If it is read broadly, all material available on the Internet that can be
accessed only by password or click-on agreement could be freed of
exemptions. Also what counts as an "agreement" or "agreed
contractual terms" is unclear. Are "click-on" agreements on the
screen included, even if everyone knows they are rarely read or, if
read, understood? Will the elimination of all or most exemptions
23 WCT, supra note 9, at art. 1, § 4 & n.1 (agreed statement adopted by the Diplomatic
Conference stating "[ilt is understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form ...
constitutes a reproduction"); WPPT, supra note 8, at art. 16, § 2 & n.14 (agreed statement
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference stating "[ilt is understood that the storage of a protected
performance... in digital form... constitutes a reproduction").
24 Stranglehold Directive, supra note 14, at art. 5, §1, at 16.
25 Id. at art. 6, § 4, at 17-18.
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against a consumer be considered an unfair contract term that may be
struck out under national consumer protection laws?
2 6
The Stranglehold Directive's prevarication is reflected in the
diverse ways EU member states have exercised the discretion given to
them to regulate over-zealous TPM use. With few exceptions, users
are now supplicants, dependent on the goodwill of right holders for
the bowls of gruel that were supposed to be their right in what WlPO
termed "the larger public interest [of] education, research and access
to information." Virtually the entire spectrum of possibilities has been
employed from, at one end, total inertia (e.g., the Netherlands) to, at
the other end, an elaborate scheme where rightholders must grant
individuals access for single private copying, where officials can
force access for public security, administrative, parliamentary or
judicial purposes, and an aggrieved party can resort, to both ADR and
court in other cases of non-access (Italy).27 Along different points of
the spectrum, we see other states setting up just ADR procedures with
a right to go to court if they fail (e.g., Greece and Latvia). Yet other
states have given disaffected users-individuals (Ireland), or both
individuals and interest groups (Germany)-the right to sue abusive
right holders. In the U.K. an individual or representative of a class of
affected individuals can complain to an official in the Secretary of
State's department, who can order the right holder to provide the user
with his exemption or be sued for damages if he does not.2 8 In
Denmark, an aggrieved user faced with a non-complying right holder
can, after four weeks, circumvent the device himself. In Norway, he
must first get approval from a state administrator. Whether time will
move states or the EU towards a more uniform model that grant users
rights instead of mere indulgences remains to be seen.
This experience highlights an aspect of anti-circumvention that the
WIPO treaties, the EU Stranglehold Directive and national laws have
studiously ignored. It is assumed that only users will abuse freedoms
available to them; right-holders will self-evidently use TPMs only to
stop such abuse and not for ulterior purposes. If perchance right
holders do abuse the system, the standard IP argument-trotted out on
every occasion by right holders (but apparently never available to
users)-is that it is for other, non-IP, laws to regulate that sort of
abuse. Since exogenous regulation of IP is typically
backward-looking, patchy or non-existent, in practice few
26 See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 2001 (L95) 29 (on unfair terms in consumer
contracts).
27 The possibilities are usefully summarized by Stefan Bechtold in CONCISE EUROPEAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 392 (Thomas Dreier & Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
28 CDPA, supra note 18, § 296ZE.
2007]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
disincentives to abuse exist. Copyright holders therefore test the
system to the maximum. Regulatory delay means that, at worst, the
abuse will be stopped only after plenty of profit is raked in. The
chances that the profiter will be forced to disgorge some or all of its
ill-gotten gains in compensation or fines are pretty slim. The risk is
certainly worth running, and in practice it is run.
TPMs are, for example, used to establish territorial barriers and
price discrimination between countries or regions-private
immigration policies and border controls that are imposed unilaterally
on the world, except that the imposer is a goods manufacturer and the
immigrants are goods, not people. The controls are an electronic
hardware lock and a corresponding software key that lets software
and hardware interact and without which the two elements are just
lumps of useless debris. Different locks and keys can be produced for
different markets. Customs or courts, instead of the Immigration
Service, can frisk down importers so that only goods with the right
credentials can enter the country. Thus distribution and pricing
systems can be established that are impregnable so long as people can
be stopped by law from bypassing the TPMs.
Immigration control of goods-parallel importing-has long been
controversial internationally. Parallel imports benefit local consumers
by providing genuine articles at the internationally lowest price
instead of prices imposed by the manufacturer and the authorized
local, often vertically integrated, distributor. Often finding
competition authorities and the principles of the general law
unhelpful, manufacturers have turned to IP laws to try to equate
parallel importers with unauthorized copiers, even though the
difference is obvious: manufacturers profit from the first sale of a
genuine good that has entered commerce but don't profit from the
sale of unauthorized copies. IP law here seeks to control the
movement of genuine goods in commerce. That is how the maxim
"think internationally, act globally" works in practice here.
Like TRIPS, however, the WIPO treaties do not demonize parallel
imports. Countries can decide their own parallel import policy,29 at
least until they are told otherwise by an FTA. For the EU,3 ° this has
meant erecting a Fortress Europe: allowing parallel imports within the
internal market, but raising the drawbridge on imports from outside
the market.31 In other words, the EU has let those doing business in or
29 WCT, supra note 9, art. 7, § 2, at 7 (contracting parties may provide conditions that
apply after the first sale of an original work or a copy of a work authorized by the author).
30 Including members of the European Economic Area, i.e., Norway, Iceland and
Lichtenstein.
31 The EU applies this rule to sale of goods only, not services such as renting, nor to
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with Europe set up and enforce Europe-wide distribution and pricing
policies and insulate them from outside competition. Consumers may
have to pay 30% more for a videogame obtained in the U.K. than for
the same game obtained off a U.S. website,32 but Eurocrats seem
content with this result so long as a German can buy the game from
the U.K. at the 30% premium and a Briton can buy the game from
Germany at the German price. European courts have supported these
results in trademark, design and copyright cases involving both
physical imports and offshore websites offering goods for import into
Europe.1
How do TPMs affect these policies? That was partly what two
cases Sony brought in the U.K. and one in Australia were about-to
protect its pricing policies. Sony moved to stop the import and
distribution of "mod chips" that would let transregional games,
designed to work with North American or Japanese NSTC-system
television receivers, work with Sony PlayStations designed only for
PAL system receivers (i.e., those in Europe). When inserted into the
PlayStation, the mod chip fools the console into believing that a
foreign game is a native of the region.
Sony won both its U.K. cases. Neither defendant appealed, which
is unsurprising given the enormous difference in resources that Sony
can throw into legal cases compared with those available to small
traders. In Sony I, on the pre-WIPO provisions protecting TPMs on
computer programs, the court decided with little ado that to load the
game on to the computer was to copy it; that the coding on the game
was designed to prevent or restrict its being loaded; and that the
importers of the mod chips knew all this and so were liable.34 The
court did not care that the lock on the PlayStation could equally
prevent non-infringing copies from being played (e.g., back-ups) or
that the TPM prevented the exercise of a right to individuals to import
even infringing copies of a work "for private and domestic use."3 5 It
added, gratuitously in view of these findings, that a Sony game that
Intemet communications.
32 On a given date in 2003, Sony videogames were reported to be selling at $20 off Sony's
North American site, $27 off its U.K. site, and $36 off its Japanese site. Brian Esler, Judas or
Messiah? The Implications of the Mod Chip Cases for Copyright in an Electronic Age I
HERTFORDSHIRE L.J. 1, 3 (2003).
' See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't v. Pacific Game Tech. (Holding) Ltd. [2006] EWHC
2509 (Pat) (holding that a Hong Kong website offering Sony videogame products in £stg
infringed trademark and design laws, as well as copyright-the issue of copies to the public
without the copyright owner's consent, contrary to CDPA § 18).
34 Sony Computer Entm't Inc. v Owen, [2002] EWHC (Ch) 45 (Eng.).
35 CDPA, supra note 18, § 22.
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had a sticker on it saying "For Japan only" amounted to a licence for
Japanese use only, so that uses outside Japan were unauthorized and
infringing.
Sony II involved both pre- and post-WIPO TPM provisions. It
reached the same result as the first case. Even though the court
accepted that the post-WIPO TPM provisions applied only to prevent
or restrict unauthorized copying, not just access, it again held that
loading is copying. A label on the games stating that they were "only
compatible" with PlayStations carrying the PAL logo again was
interpreted to mean the games were licensed only for playing on such
consoles. The importer, manufacturer, seller or advertiser of the mod
chip was strictly liable for selling it because it was "primarily"
designed or produced to enable or facilitate circumvention of the
TPM and had "only a limited commercially significant purpose" to do
anything else.36 The installer was also liable because he knew or had
reasonable ground to believe the device would be used to circumvent.
But mod chips destined for export were not caught because the court
was concerned only with preventing infringement in the U.K.37
The ease with which liability was found in Sony H is a little
disconcerting, because these provisions (unlike those for computer
software TPMs) impose criminal as well as civil liability on
commercial handlers of circumvention devices; to avoid liability,
defendants carry the onus of proving they did not know and had no
reasonable ground to believe that a device enabled or facilitated
circumvention.38
On one level, these decisions do advance the EU's policies by
stopping unauthorized parallel imports into the EU, while supporting
the circulation of authorized imports within the EU, which uses the
PAL system. But ordinary European consumers are also blocked from
playing games they may have lawfully acquired in, or imported or
downloaded from, Japan or North America on PAL PlayStations
sourced within the EU. Consumers who bring NSTC-compatible
PlayStations into Europe either as immigrants or importers are also
impeded from playing PAL games lawfully acquired in the EU. A
question that lurks behind these cases is whether a seller who fails
clearly to notify buyers in advance of these deliberate deficiencies is
breaking implied promises of fitness for purpose or for enjoyment of
36 Id. at § 296ZD(1)(b)(ii).
37 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't Inc. v Ball [2004] EWHC (Ch) 1738
[19]-[21] (Eng.); see also CDPA, supra note 18, § 296 (computer programs pre-WIPO); CDPA,
supra note 18, § 296ZD (post-WIPO, sale, etc.); CDPA, supra note 18, §296ZA (installation).
38 CDPA, supra note 18, § 296ZB(5) ("It is a defence to any prosecution ... for the
defendant to prove that he did not know.").
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quiet possession on the sale of goods, which may entitle the buyer to
reject them or get compensation.
Sony I and II are difficult on more technical levels. Sony certainly
has the legal expertise to know how to write bans and restricted
licences. Is it self-evident that the soft language on the game labels,
saying they work only with a PAL receiver or in Japan, is equivalent
to banning readers from trying, by themselves or with help, to make
the games work on a non-PAL player or using them outside Japan? 39
Such notices are anyway effective only where clearly brought to a
buyer's notice before purchase; even then they are usually treated at
best as warnings, or as attempts (if given timeously) to negate or
modify implied promises of fitness for purpose.
Sony H also did not consider the language in the Stranglehold
Directive, mentioned earlier, that transient or incidental copying is
allowed for technological reasons, i.e., if digital products are to be
something other than junk. The same language appears in the U.K.
Act, although, like the EU Stranglehold Directive, it does not apply to
computer programs or databases.40 The court did not clearly sort out
the TPM engineering. Quite possibly, the copying was transient or
incidental copying of non-computer program material on to RAM and
so outside the TPM provisions. The point should have been expressly
dealt with. The court in both Sony I and II plainly thought the
legislature meant to protect all forms of TPMs from all forms of anti-
circumvention and summarily dismissed arguments that tried to
circumvent anti-circumvention. But the U.K. act is not worded that
expansively and so need not and should not be read it as if it were.
The Australian counterpart to Sony II made that point in 2005.41
Again, Sony complained about mod chips being sold and installed
that could allow PlayStations to run not only transregional but also
unauthorized copies. The defendant, a small shop-owner, accepted the
mod chips were circumvention devices but said Sony's TPM was
designed to prevent access, not copying; the circumvention of only
anti-copying TPMs was all that Australian law forbade. The
astonishing thing about this case-given that losers in Australian
litigation usually have to pay a good part of the winner's legal costs-
39 Cf. Mars UK Ltd. v. Teknowledge, Ltd. [1999] EWHC (Pat) 226 [33] (Eng.) (stating
that a notice on black box technology saying "'confidential-you may not de-encrypt"' does not
place the decoder under a duty of confidence, or it seems, to the notifier).
40 CDPA, supra note 18, § 28A ("Copyright in a literary work, other than a computer
program or a database ... is not infringed by the making of a temporary copy which is transient
or incidental.").
4t Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't, [2005] HCA 58, [551-[56] (Austl.)
(disagreeing with the interpretation of the English court). Whether the case still remains good
law in Australia is unclear, since the statutory language has since been changed.
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is the persistence of this defendant. He won at trial but lost in the
intermediate appeal court after the invariable appeal by Sony;
however, with the three appeal judges all producing different reasons,
the defendant managed to get leave to appeal. Australia's final appeal
court, the High Court of Australia, disagreed with almost everything
the intermediate court judges had said and restored the trial judgment
for the defendant.
Like EU and U.K. law, the Australian TPM provisions implement
the WIPO treaties, but with different language. The Australian court
did not comment on Sony I or II other than to note the difference in
language in passing. The Australian judges, however, proved
themselves more English than the English: their method of reasoning
runs truer to the English common law tradition than did the opinions
written by the English first instance judges.42 Had Australian law
been worded the same as the U.K.'s, the Australian judges would
likely have reached a different result from both Sony I and I.
The clincher was that the Australian court refused to read the TPM
provisions expansively. It gave a number of reasons. First, the
wording and purpose of the provisions were opaque because they
resulted from a compromise. Some groups wanted broad
anti-circumvention measures, others wanted narrower ones; still
others wanted to preserve or extend user rights in the face of TPMs.
Second, TPMs preventing access moved copyright law far beyond its
traditional purpose-stopping copying. Clear language might achieve
this "paracopyright" purpose, but it wasn't there. Anyway, could a
federal legislature, acting under a power to legislate for copyright,
regulate access to material? 43 Third, selling circumvention devices
was a crime. Nobody should be made a criminal on ambiguous
language.44 Fourth, PlayStation console and game owners also had
fundamental rights that had existed well before copyright laws did: to
enjoy and use their property as they wished. Those fundamental rights
could be cut down only by clear language.45 Fifth, there was no
42 The English Sony cases were first instance decisions argued by junior counsel. They
were clearly not as rigorously argued or decided as the counterpart case was in the Australian
final appellate court, with seven lawyers (including four silks) arguing before six judges over
the four different judgments delivered in the inferior courts.
43 See Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't, [2005] HCA 58, [219] (Kirby
J., concurring) (Austl.) (stating that a legislature should only attach criminal liability to
circumvention of technological protection measures on copyrighted material in unmistakeable
terms).
44 This reasoning would not apply to Sony I, since circumventing computer programs is
not presently a crime in the U.K.
45 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't, [2005] HCA 58, [213]-[214]
(Kirby J., concurring) (Austl.) (stating that an individual who purchases a CD-ROM overseas
has a pre-existing property right that should allow that individual to modify a console purchased
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reason to help TPMs do indirectly what Australia's copyright law
refused to do directly, namely, partition global markets. 46 Lastly, only
a small part of the game is reproduced on RAM at any time. It was
not proved that this fleeting copy reproduced a substantial part of the
game's copyrighted material.47
CONCLUSION: OF USER RIGHTS AND OWNER DUTIES
The WIPO treaties are about owner rights and user duties. The
treaties do not suggest that users have any rights nor that owners have
any duties. These omissions merit correction.
User Rights
The WIPO treaties persist in the rhetoric that what users may do in
relation to protected items are exceptions to or limitations on the
control rights of owners. This style of language certainly suits
copyright owners but its effects are pernicious. It treats what owners
can do as rights (with all that word connotes), and what everyone else
can do as indulgences, aberrations from some preordained norm,
activities to be narrowly construed and not extended. The metaphor
language of balance cannot sensibly work from such a starting point:
how can rights be balanced against exceptions? The scales already
start weighted on one side.
The way out of this linguistic hole is easy enough. Since a use that
falls within an exception or limitation does not infringe copyright, the
owner's right must stop at the point where a user can lawfully act.
"Exceptions and limitations" define the outer limits of the owner's
rights. Owners cannot control acts in this territory because their rights
do not run there. What owners cannot control, users must be able
freely to do. If we are to balance like against like, what acts users may
do must themselves be treated as their rights; these rights can then be
balanced off against the rights of owners. Thus, compromises can be
fairly struck when policy is formulated and resulting laws are
interpreted.
This approach already has respectable judicial backing. In 2004,
the Supreme Court of Canada declined to analyze fair dealing as an
in Australia to play the CD-ROM and language is not clear enough to compel a different result).
4 Id. at [211] (stating that TPMs may allow Sony to pursue different pricing structures in
varying geographic markets for products coded to function only in certain geographic regions).
47 The court also held that the reproduction was not in a "material form" for Australian
law, unlike U.S. law, did not include cases where a further device was needed before a work
was copy-able.
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exception even though the relevant provision appeared in a part of the
Copyright Act headed "Exceptions." Instead the court adopted a
concept of "user rights" that formed an integral part of the balance
that produced the copyright system. Speaking for a unanimous court,
the Chief Justice said:
[T]he fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly
understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than
simply a defence. Any act falling within the fair dealing
exception will not be an infringement of copyright. The fair
dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act,
is a user's right. In order to maintain the proper balance
between the rights of a copyright owner and users' interests,
it must not be interpreted restrictively. As Professor Vaver
has explained: "User rights are not just loopholes. Both
owner rights and user rights should therefore be given the fair
and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation." 49
Such an approach has also appeared in the United States,50 although
too sporadically yet to amount to a trend. Nothing in the WIPO
treaties nor its implementing statutes precludes the same approach
from being taken in Europe.51
Owner Duties
Copyright law today nevertheless seems to be mainly about rights,
and the rights of only one class of actor: copyright owners.52
49 Law Society of Upper Canada v. CCH Canadian Ltd., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 364 (Can.)
(citing DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 171 (2000)).
50 See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001)
("I believe that fair use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than
merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of
copyright. However, fair use is commonly referred to an affirmative defense, see Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994),
and, as we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, we will apply it as such.... Nevertheless,
the fact that the fair use right must be procedurally asserted as an affirmative defense does not
detract from its constitutional significance as a guarantor to access and use for First Amendment
purposes." (citations omitted)).
51 Bechtold, supra note 27, at 369 ("In recent years, it has been increasingly questioned
whether copyright limitations should be conceptualized as mere exceptions to exclusive rights
or whether they grant beneficiaries real subjective rights. The [European Directive of 2001]
does not adopt an explicit position on this issue."); c.f. Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Users'
Rights: Reconstructing Copyright Policy on Utilitarian Grounds 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1
(2007) (arguing that the Berne Convention allows for greater protection of users' rights than
presently afforded under most implementations).
52 This section draws partly on David Vaver, Publishers & Copyright: Rights Without
Duties? 40 BIBLIOTHEKSDIENST 743, 749-50, available at http://www.zlb.de/aktivitaeten
/bdneu/heftinhalte2006/Recht020606.pdf.
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Everyone other than them, it seems, has responsibilities. Rights
without responsibilities are wonderful things, especially for
monopolists. The main reason for these laws having been passed from
the outset can then be conveniently forgotten: to quote from a
WWI-vintage case from the U.S. Supreme Court, "not the creation of
private fortunes for the owners of [copyrights], but is 'to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts."'
That point was clear in the 18th century when the Statute of Anne
was passed. The Statute did not merely give authors a copyright; with
it came duties imposed on publishers, who, as all knew, would
inevitably own the copyright by assignment from the author. As part
of its aim of "the encouragement of learning," the Statute required
publishers to provide nine free copies of the publication "upon the
best paper" to the centres of learning: the English and Scottish
university libraries and Edinburgh's law library. Swingeing penalties
were provided for failure: the value of the book, plus £5, plus costs,
for each book not delivered. As importantly, publishers owed the
public another duty: to keep prices "[]reasonable. ' 4 Any member of
the public who felt aggrieved by a price that he or she thought
unreasonable could complain to one of a group of designated
officials: the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishop of London, any
chief judge, the vice-chancellor of the university of Oxford or
Cambridge or his counterpart at Edinburgh. The tribunal could then
summon the bookseller or printer to determine whether or not the
price was right. If it was not, the tribunal could reduce it to what it
thought "just and reasonable." Again, a swingeing penalty was
provided for disobedience.
I do not suggest a return to the idea of giving university presidents
and vice-chancellors power to set book prices, however intriguing a
notion that might seem today. My point rather is that from its
inception copyright has been considered a right that was freighted
with a public interest. The copyright owner was in this respect like an
innkeeper, who was obliged to provide food and lodgings to the
wayfarer who needed to stay the night and had money to pay. The
keeper could not ask an outrageous sum even if (particularly if) his
inn were the only one for miles. He was providing a necessity that
placed him under a special duty to deal, and to deal honestly and
fairly. Similar duties were placed on other people providing the
necessities of life such as common carriers and salvors.
54 Copyright Act, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 4 (Eng.) (commonly referred to as the Statute of
Anne).
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I suggest there is a need to a return to this mindset when dealing
with copyright owners. We should recognize that copyright owners
have duties as well as rights. Among these duties are the provision of
fair access to content at fair and non-discriminatory prices. For the
provision of information to the populace is no less important today
than was the provision of provender and lodging to the travellers of
old.
